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INCOME TAX-TAX FREE TRANSFERS TO
CONTROLLED CORPORATIONS
I. INTRODUCTION
Section 351 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 provides for
the nontaxable exchange of property solely for the stock or securi-
ties of a controlled corporation.' Prior to the enactment of the
Revenue Act of 1921, there was no statutory provision permitting
the nonrecognition of gain or loss on the transfer of property to a
controlled corporation.2 Thus, exchanges of this nature were
treated as giving rise to gain or loss.'
Compelling business considerations often precipitate transfers
of property ownership from an individual to a corporate form.
Limited liability is probably the best known and most frequently
used reason for choosing to incorporate. Other characteristics mak-
ing the corporate form of business enterprise attractive are its con-
tinuity of existence and transferability of ownership interests, its
flexibility in creating various types of ownership interests, its rela-
tive ease in attracting outside capital, and the centralized manage-
ment that necessarily accompanies corporate organization.
'The pertinent parts of section 351 provide:
(a) General Rule. No gain or loss shall be recognized if property is
transferred to a corporation (including, in the case of transfers made on
or before June 30, 1967, an investment company) by one or more persons
solely in exchange for stock or securities in such corporation and immedi-
ately after the exchange such person or persons are in control (as defined
in section 368(c)) of the corporation. For purposes of this section, stock
or securities issued for services shall not be considered as issued in return
for property.
(b) Receipt of Property. If subsection (a) would apply to an exchange
but for the fact that there is received, in addition to the stock or securities
permitted to be received under subsection (a), other property or money,
then-
(1) gain (if any) to such recipient shall be recognized, but not in
excess of-
(A) the amount of the money received, plus
(B) the fair market value of such other property received; and
(2) no loss to such recipient shall be recognized.
(c) Special Rule. In determining control, for purposes of this section, the
fact that any corporate transferor distributes part or all of the stock which
it receives in the exchange to its shareholders shall not be taken into
account.
21NT. REv. CODE of 1921, ch. 136, 42 Stat. 227.
'Livingston v. Commissioner, 18 B.T.A. 1184 (1930).
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Recognizing and taxing gains arising from transactions involv-
ing the transfer of property to a controlled corporation would im-
pose an undue onus on many relatively small businesses operated
as sole proprietorships or partnerships. Congress recognized a need
for these transfers, realizing that a transaction of this nature
merely represented a change in the form of ownership rather than
a gain or loss. Instead of leaving it to the ingenuity of the taxpayer
to find a way around these transfers, Congress enacted section
202(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Act of 1921. This statute was the
precursor of section 351.
Section 202(c) (3) basically provided that no gain or loss would
be recognized on the exchange of property for stock or securities
of a controlled corporation.' Of course, this piece of legislation was
a two-way street for the taxpayer. It enabled the taxpayer to
transfer property to a corporation without realizing gain on the
transaction while, at the same time, denying the taxpayer the
beneficial tax consequences arising from any loss that might be
involved in such a transaction. With only minor changes in statu-
tory language, a provision similar to section 202(c)(3) has been
included in every pertinent revenue statute enacted since the 1921
Act.
The Internal Revenue Code of 1954 redesignated this provision
as section 351. It essentially provides that no gain or loss is recog-
nized upon the transfer of property to a corporation by one or more
persons solely in exchange for the stock or securities of the corpora-
tion, if immediately after the exchange the transferor or transferors
are in control of the corporation.'
II. THE CONTROL REQUIREMENT
Control is not defined in section 351, but the reader is referred
to section 368(c). Section 368(c) dictates that the transferors must
own at least eighty percent of all voting stock and eighty percent
of all other classes of stock outstanding after the transfer.' The
eighty percent requirement has been interpreted to mean that the
transferors must own eighty percent of each class of stock.'
The eighty percent requirement is clear enough to raise few
questions concerning its application, but the phrase "immediately
'INT. REV. CODE of 1921, ch. 136, 42 Stat. 227.
5INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 351(a).
'Id. § 368(c).
Rev. Rul. 259, 1959-2 CUM. BULL. 112.
(Vol. 76
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after the exchange" has caused several problems. At first, the
courts held that momentary control by the transferor after the
exchange was sufficient to meet the control requirement." Re-
cently, the courts and the Commissioner have taken a more restric-
tive stance, maintaining that, if the transferor is legally committed
to give up more than twenty percent of the stock, then, holding a
controlling amount momentarily will not meet the control require-
ments of section 351.
If the transferor decides to give away some of the stock and
directs that more than twenty percent of it be issued directly to
non-transferors, the courts have held that section 351 does not
apply, since the transferor never held the controlling amount of
stock."' Exactly the opposite result is reached by the courts, and
exactly the same distribution of stock is achieved by the transferor,
if he first receives the stock and then gives it to the intended
donees." The transferor can also qualify if he gives some of the
property to the donee and has him transfer it to the corporation
for stock. 2 In the former case, the transferor of the property re-
ceives all the stock, and his intention to transfer it immediately to
a third party does not affect the satisfaction of the control require-
ment unless he is legally bound to make the transfer. 3 In the latter
case, the recipient of the stock is himself a transferor of property,
and any stock received by him will be counted in the control group.
The effects of these interpretations of the control requirement
are twofold. First, the unwary transferor can fail in his attempt to
qualify for section 351 treatment if he does not go through the legal
formalities. Second, the alert transferor has an option if he does
not want section 351 to apply in order to obtain a stepped-up basis
hPortland Oil Co. v. Commissioner, 109 F.2d 479 (lst Cir. 1940).
'May Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 200 F.2d 852 (8th Cir. 1953); Birggs
Darby Const. Co. v. Commissioner, 119 F.2d 89 (5th Cir. 1941); Heberlein Manhat-
tan Bldg. Co., 27 T.C. 1032 (1957); S. Klein on the Square, Inc., 14 T.C. 786 (1950),
af'd, 188 F.2d 127 (2d Cir. 1951); American Bantam Car Co., 11 T.C. 397 (1948),
affd per curiam, 177 F.2d 513 (3d Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 920 (1950);
Independent Oil Co., 6 T.C. 194 (1946); Rev. Rul. 522, 1970-2 Cum. BULL. 81.
"Fahs v. Florida Mach. & Foundry Co., 168 F.2d 957 (5th Cir. 1948); Mojoiner
& Sons, Inc., 12 T.C. 837 (1949).
"Wilgard Realty Co. v. Commissioner, 127 F.2d 514 (2d Cir. 1942). The court
held that the transferor had control, and his intention to transfer it was not impor-
tant since he was not legally bound to make the transfer.
12F.W. Drybrough, 42 T.C. 1029 (1964). The court held that the recipient of the
property was a transferor in his own right.
"Wilgard Realty Co. v. Commissioner, 127 F.2d 514 (2d Cir. 1942).
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in the transferred property. He can avoid its application by
directing the transferee to give him less than eighty percent of the
stock or by legally binding himself prior to the exchange to convey
more than twenty percent of the stock to a non-transferor third
party.
III. SERVICES
Under section 351(a), "stock or securities issued for services
shall not be considered as issued in return for property."" Since
services are not considered property, stock issued solely for services
will not be counted towards the control test because the persons
in control must all be transferors of property.'" If the person receiv-
ing the stock for services is also a transferor of property, then all
of his stock will be counted in the control test.'6 But, if the property
transferred is a mere token designed to qualify the stock received
for services, then none of the stock received will be counted.
The problem with this facet of section 351 exchanges is
whether activities that appear to be services can also qualify as
property. Clearly, services directly to or for the new corporation are
not treated as property.' 8 When the services yield an equitable
interest in property, the transfer of the equitable interest has been
held to be a transfer of property.'9 Stock issued in exchange for
money is an exchange for property. 0 The surrender of judgment
"INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 351(a).
'"William A. James, 53 T.C. 63 (1969); Columbia Oil & Gas Co., 41 B.T.A. 38
(1940), aff'd, 118 F.2d 459 (5th Cir. 1941).
"Treas. Reg. § 1.351-1(a)(2) (1967).
"Treas. Reg. § 1.351-1(a)(1)(ii) (1967). See Jacob S. Kamborian, 56 T.C. 847
(1971).
"In Garrett v. Campbell, 360 F.2d 382 (5th Cir. 1966), taxpayer was an em-
ployee of the transferor, and all stock he received was held payment for services.
In United States v. Frazell, 335 F.2d 487 (5th Cir. 1964), rehearing denied, 339 F.2d
885 (5th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 961 (1965), taxpayer drew maps of mining
territory for a corporation to be formed. The amount by which the value of the stock
issued to him exceeded the value of the maps contributed by him was payment for
services. Mailloux v. Commissioner, 320 F.2d 60 (5th Cir. 1963) (stock issued for
assistance in financing mining claims); William A. James, 53 T.C. 63 (1969) (stock
issued for obtaining F.H.A. financing commitment); Treas. Reg. § 1.351-1(a)(i)
(1967).
"Roberts Co., 5 T.C. 1 (1945) (Under state law, a contingent fee claim
amounted to an equitable interest in the subject matter upon successful completion
of the litigation); F.L.G. Straubel, 29 B.T.A. 516 (1933) (Stock issued for an
equitible interest in a patent was held issued for property).
2'Halliburton v. Commissioner, 78 F.2d 265 (9th Cir. 1935); George M. Holstein
[Vol. 76
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claims in exchange for stock is a stock-for-property transaction,'
as is the issuance of stock by the new corporation for notes of the
preceding business. 2 The unqualified transfer of a trade secret is
a transfer of property. 23 Finally, an agreement by an inventor to
assign future improvements on his invention has been held to be




IV. STOCK OR SECURITIES
Since a transfer must be "solely in exchange for stock or secur-
ities" 27 in order to qualify for section 351 treatment, the question
of what constitutes stock or securities becomes very important.
Generally, the term stock has been considered self-
explanatory. The regulations provide some aid by specifying that
stock rights or warrants are not stock, 2 but case law shows that
under some circumstances stock options will be considered stock. 2
The determining factor in the decision to count the options is the
likelihood of their exercise.29 If they are bound to be exercised, they
will be counted as stock in the control test, but if some doubt as
to their exercise exists, they will not be included." Stock subscrip-
tions:" present a similar problem. If substantial portions of stock
III, 23 T.C. 923 (1955); Portland Oil Co., 38 B.T.A. 757 (1938); Rev. Rul. 356, 1969-
1 Cum. BULL. 101.
"Gage Bros., 13 T.C. 472 (1949); Alexander E. Duncan, 9 T.C. 468 (1947); E.S.
Dillard, 20 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 137 (1961).
2Hartford-Empire Co. v. Commissioner, 137 F.2d 540 (2nd Cir. 1943).
2Rev. Rul. 56, 1964-1 CUM. BULL. 133, modifying Rev. Rul. 17, 1955-1 Cum.
BULL. 388, as amplified by Rev. Rul. 564, 1971-2 CuM. BULL. 179.
2 James C. Hamrick, 43 T.C. 21 (1964).
2INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 351(a).
2 A stock warrant is a certificate issued by a corporation conveying
to the holder rights to purchase shares of its stock at a specified price.
The term stock right means the privilege attaching to each outstanding
share of stock to buy a fractional share or specified number of shares of
new capital stock.
W. MEW, S, C. JOHNSON, T. KELLER & A. MOSICH, INTERMEDIATE ACCOUNTING 499
(1968) [hereinafter cited as MEIGS].
27Treas. Reg. § 1.351-1(a)(1) (1967).
2Commissioner v. National Bellas Hess, Inc., 220 F.2d 415 (8th Cir. 1955).
29Id.
"Barker v. United States, 200 F.2d 223 (9th Cir. 1952); Robert J. Harder, 17
CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 494 (1958).
3 1Stock subscriptions occur when stock is sold under contract (subscription
contract) calling for the purchaser (subscriber) to pay at a later date. MEiGs, supra
note 26, at 479.
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are subscribed by non-transferors, but are not yet paid for at the
time of the exchange, control will be lost to the extent that the
subscribers are non-transferors 2
The definition of securities is harder to determine. Bonds,
because of their formality, have usually been classified as securi-
ties.- Debentures 3' present a slightly more difficult problem, but
they, too, are usually considered securities.15 The key exception
arises when they are used to raise money to meet current expenses,
rather than for purposes of investment in the assets of the busi-
ness. 31 This exception is made because money invested to meet
current expenses does not give the investor a continuing interest
in the corporation.
37
The classification of notes is determined in a similar manner,
but they are more suspect than either of the two preceding catego-
ries because of the greater informality involved. Under the proper
conditions, notes can qualify as securities.- The criteria applied to
notes is best stated in the following excerpt from Camp Wolters
Enterprises v. Commissioner:
The test as to whether notes are securities is not a mechanical
determination of the time period of the note. Though time is an
important factor, the controlling consideration is an overall
evaluation of the nature of the debt, the degree of participation
and continuing interest in the business, the extent of
proprietary interest compared with the similarity of the note to
a cash payment, the purpose of the advances, etc."
3 Charles Hall, 31 B.T.A. 125 (1934).
-Commissioner v. Tyng, 106 F.2d 55 (2d Cir. 1939) (unsecured bonds with
twenty to forty year maturities); Commissioner v. Freund, 98 F.2d 201 (3d Cir.
1938) (bonds with one to six year maturities); Wolf Envelope Co., 17 T.C. 471 (1951)
(right to redeem after 10 years held not to disqualify bonds); Rev. Rul. 98, 1959-1
CUm. BULL. 76 (average term of 61 years qualified); B. BVITKER & J. EUSTICE,
FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS 3.04, at 16 (3d ed.
1971) [hereinafter cited as BirER & EusTicEl (A security is "a piece of paper
evidencing a corporate debt with mermaids and a steam locomotive at the top").
"'Debentures are bonds that do not have specific assets pledged to secure pay-
ment of interest and principal. R. JOHNSON, FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT 504 (3d ed.
1969).
"Commissioner v. Neustandt's Trust, 131 F.2d 528 (2d Cir. 1942); Alan 0.
Hickok, 32 T.C. 80 (1959); Karl B. Segall, 38 B.T.A. 43 (1938); E.S. Dillard, 20 CCH
Tax Ct. Mem. 137 (1961).
UL & E Stirn, Inc. v. Commissioner, 107 F.2d 390 (2d Cir. 1939).
371d.
3'Parkland Place Co. v. United States, 354 F.2d 916 (5th Cir. 1966); Burnham
v. Commissioner, 86 F.2d 776 (7th Cir. 1936); George A. Nye, 50 T.C. 203 (1968).
322 T.C. 737, 751 (1954).
[Vol. 76
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While the above reference is to notes, the same criteria are applied
to all forms of corporate debt.
Although the time test has generally given way to what is
called the "continuity of interest" test, espoused in Camp Wolters,
some generalizations based on the time factor can be made. Nor-
mally, instruments with maturities of less than five years are not
considered securities. " However, when it can be established that
the instrument was intended to represent an indefinite and pro-
prietary interest in the new corporation, it will be classed as a
security in spite of its short maturity." Notes with maturities of
ten years or longer have been held to be securities on a fairly
consistent basis.2 The status of instruments with maturities of
between five and ten years cannot be generalized since no trend in
either direction is apparent.
In Pinellas Ice & Cold Storage Co. v. Commissioner," the
United States Supreme Court first introduced the "continuity of
interest" doctrine. This doctrine provides that the term of the debt
is not the controlling factor in its classification. The controlling
factor is whether the debt gives the transferor a continuing
proprietary interest in the corporation. LeTulle v. Scofield" car-
ried this doctrine a step further by holding that a transferor who
received only bonds lacked the necessary proprietary interest to
qualify for section 351 treatment. This decision has been harshly
criticized on the grounds that the word securities in section 351
does not seem to denote a continuity of interest requirement, and
the section requires the transferor to receive stock or securities, not
"'Pinellas Ice & Cold Storage Co. v. Commissioner, 287 U.S. 462 (1933); Turner
v. Commissioner, 303 F.2d 94 (4th Cir. 1962); Pacific Pub. Serv. Co. v. Commis-
sioner, 154 F.2d 713 (9th Cir. 1946); Cortland Specialty Co. v. Commissioner, 60
F.2d 937 (2d Cir. 1932); Robert W. Adams, 58 T.C. 41 (1972); Peter Raich, 46 T.C.
604 (1966); Nevill Coke & Chem. Co., 3 T.C. 113 (1944); Sisto Fin. Corp., 47 B.T.A.
425 (1942); Marjorie Fleming Lloyd-Smith, 40 B.T.A. 214 (1939); BrrrKER & Eus-
TICE, supra note 33, at 15.
"United States v. Mills, 399 F.2d 944 (5th Cir. 1968). The jury found that a
one year note, which had been renewed three times and which the holder expressed
no interest in collecting, was "inextricably and indefinitely" involved in the ven-
ture.
42Parkland Place Co. v. Commissioner, 354 F.2d 916 (5th Cir. 1966); Campbell
v. Carter Foundation, 322 F.2d 827 (5th Cir. 1963); Burnham v. Commissioner, 86
F.2d 776 (7th Cir. 1936); George A. Nye, 50 T.C. 203 (1968); Baker Commodities,
Inc., 48 T.C. 374 (1967). See BITTKER & EusTicE, supra note 33, at 15.
43287 U.S. 462 (1933).
"308 U.S. 415 (1940).
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stock in addition to securities.15 Both cases relied on the predeces-
sor of the present section 351 which contained a requirement that
the transferors receive stock in proportion to the property they
transfer to the corporation." Despite the exclusion of that test from
the present section," there are no indications in the legislative
history or the subsequent case law that the Pinellas-LeTulle line
has been overruled. Therefore, the Commissioner has recently
taken the position that a transferor receiving only debt instru-
ments is excluded from section 351 treatment.4 '
Since no one concrete test exists for defining securities, a pair
of cases may serve to illustrate the difficulty courts have had with
this problem. In one case, an Ohio district court found that notes
which would not qualify as securities would satisfy the continuity
of interest test because they were the equivalent of an equity inter-
est. 19 In the other case, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
disallowed bonds because an anxious transferor had insisted that
an acknowledgement of debt be issued to him while his accountant
and attorney investigated what form the bond should take."" The
lesson of these two cases is simple. They instruct the potential
transferor and his attorney to make sure that the debt instrument
received for the property transferred represents a continuing
interest in the new corporation and not something which closely
resembles cash.
V. MID-STREAM TRANSFER PROBLEMS
When a going concern incorporates, questions arise concerning
what should be taxed to the transferor or transferors, what should
be taxed to the new corporation, and what should not be taxed at
all. The application of the tax benefit rule has caused problems
with his facet of section 351 transactions and undoubtedly will con-
':Griswold, "Securities" and "Continuity of Interest", 58 HARV. L. REV. 705
(1945).
"INT. REV. CODE of 1928, ch. 852, § 112, 45 Stat. 791 (now INT. REV. CODE of
1954, § 351).
17S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 264 (1954), contains the following
example: "If M and N each owning property having a value of $100.00 transfers
[sic] such property to a newly formed corporation X, and M receives all of the
stock, such transaction would not be subject to tax under section 351."
"Rev. Rul. 73-472, 1973 INT. REV. BULL. No. 45, at 16.
"Stanley, Inc. v. Schuster, 295 F. Supp. 812 (S.D. Ohio 1969). The court said
that the notes had the same effect as if the transferor had received stock.
5Turner v. Commissioner, 303 F.2d 94 (4th Cir. 1962). The court held the
acknowledgment had the effect of a demand note.
[Vol. 76
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tinue to do so in the future. "Early case law developed the princi-
ple that where a deduction in a prior year had reduced the
taxpayer's taxable income, a subsequent recovery of the deducted
item had to be included in income."'" This principle is termed the
tax benefit rule. Prior to 1970, this rule was applied to require
transferors to include in income the allowance for bad debts upon
the transfer of accounts receivable from a going business to a new
corporation. Nash v. United States" ended this practice with re-
gard to the transfer of net accounts receivable5 3 because the
transferor actually made no recovery of a prior deduction. 4 The
rule will probably still be applied to a transfer at face value 5 since
the reserve deducted will be recovered in the form of either stock
or securities.",
The rule could also apply to cases where the cost of materials
and supplies is deducted as a business expense at their purchase,
if the materials and supplies are still on hand at the time of the
transfer. Assuming the transferor receives stock or securities for
these items, he will probably have to count their value as income
in the year of the transfer. 7
Another problem concerns efforts by transferors to transfer
income earned for personal services to their controlled
corporations. Lucas v. Earl" and Helvering v. Horst59 established
the rule that income for personal services could not be assigned.
Subsequent case law has refused to allow a transferor to avoid his
own tax liability by assigning his personal service income to a
controlled corporation. If he makes such a transfer, he is taxed on
the income when the corporation collects it.60
3'I S. SURREY, W. WARREN, P. McDANIEL & H. AULT, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION
738 (1972).
51398 U.S. 1 (1970).
"Net accounts receivable are the accounts receivable less the allowance for bad
debts.
"Nash v. United States, 398 U.S. 1 (1970); Rowe III v. United States, 428 F.2d
874 (6th Cir. 1970); Schmidt Estate v. Commissioner, 355 F.2d 111 (9th Cir. 1966).
'Face value means a transfer without first deducting the allowance for bad
debts.
"West Seattle Nat'l Bank v. Commissioner, 288 F.2d 47 (9th Cir. 1961) (ap-
plied to a section 337 liquidation, but the principle remains the same).
5 BIrKER & EUSTICE, supra note 33 3.17, at 60.
5 281 U.S. 111 (1930).
51311 U.S. 112 (1940).
cBrown v. Commissioner, 115 F.2d 337 (2d Cir. 1940) (assignment of fees for
legal services); Clinton Davidson, 43 B.T.A. 576 (1941) (assignment of insurance
commissions).
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The transfer of uncollected service fees of a going business is
not considered an assignment of income when the business itself
is transferred to a new corporation." The transfer of notes
containing accrued interest or profit are not assignments of income
but transfers of property, 2 as is an interest in a joint venture. "
In other instances, the Commissoner has used his power to
compel a change in accounting to clearly reflect income" in order
to prevent transferors from passing income earned prior to incorpo-
ration on to the new corporation. A contractor who uses a com-
pleted contract method of accounting 5 may be required to change
his accounting method to a percentage of completion method " in
order to include in income his pro rata share of the profit." But the
commissioner has lost in an attempt to impute the entire profit to
the transferor. " The power to compel a change in accounting can
also be used to demand a reallocation of expenses if it is deter-
mined that they are not distributed in such a way as to reflect a
clear distribution of income. 9
The key concern in this area is one of timing the flow of income
and expenses so that the transferor and the transferee corporation
each receive what is attributable to them. The cases indicate that
attempts by the transferor to avoid taxes by assigning his income
to a controlled corporation will prove futile.
VI. ASSUMPTION OF LIABILITIES
Section 351 provides that, if "other property or money" is
received in addition to stock or securities, gain shall be recognized
to the extent of the amount of money received plus the fair market
"Thomas W. Briggs, 15 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 440 (1956) (incorporation of a
welcome wagon business).
12Arthur L. Kniffen, 39 T.C. 553 (1962) (accrued interest); Divine v. United
States, 10 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 5403, 62-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 9632 (W.D. Tenn. 1962)
(notes containing profit).
"Divine v. United States, 10 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 5403, 62-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 9632
(W.D. Tenn. 1962).
GINT. REV. CODE of 1954, §§ 446(b) & 482.
"Under this method, an accrual basis taxpayer reports income only on the
completion of a contract, not when it is earned as would normally be the case.
MFIc.s, supra note 26, at 293.
"Under this method, the taxpayer reports the percentage of income he is enti-
tled to receive as he earns it by completing the contract. Id.
"7Palmer v. Commissioner, 267 F.2d 434 (9th Cir. 1959).
"Commissioner v. Montgomery, 144 F.2d 313 (5th Cir. 1944).
"Rooney v. United States, 305 F.2d 681 (9th Cir. 1962).
[Vol. 76
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value of the other property received.70 In many, if not most, section
351 exchanges, the transferee corporation assumes liabilities of the
transferor or takes property encumbered by liabilities. For years
after the enactment of section 202(c) (3) of the Revenue Act of 1921,
the general view was that the assumption of liabilities or the taking
of property subject to liabilities by the transferee was not the
equivalent of the receipt of money or other property by the trans-
feror and was not a taxable event.7' However, in United States v.
Hendler,'7 the United States Supreme Court reversed this view by
holding that a gain resulting to a corporation from the assumption
and payment of its indebtedness by another corporation with
which it merged was not exempt from taxation under the Revenue
Act of 1928.
In Hendler, the Borden Company and the Hendler Creamery
Company, Inc., executed a merger which resulted in realized gains
of more than six million dollars to the Hendler Company. Pursuant
to the merger plan, Borden assumed and paid $500,000 of the
bonded indebtedness of Hendler. The court of appeals affirmed the
judgment of the district court which held all Hendler gains nontax-
able. However, the Supreme Court, in reversing the decision,
viewed the assumption and payment of Hendler's debt by Borden
as a direct payment to the Hendler Company. In substance, the
Supreme Court treated the assumption and discharge of the trans-
feror corporation's indebtedness by the transferee corporation as
other property or "boot" and taxed it as income to the transferor.
As a result of this decision, Congress enacted legislation which
reversed Hendler. This legislation, now embodied in section 357(a)
of the 1954 Code, provides that the assumption of liabilities or the
taking of property subject to liabilities does not constitute "boot"
to the transferor.3
"'INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 351.
7'BITrKER & EUSTICE, supra note 33, 3.07, at 22.
72303 U.S. 564 (1938).
7 INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 357. Section 357 provides:
(a) General Rule. Except as provided in subsections (b) and (c), if-
(1) the taxpayer receives property which would be permitted to
be received uner section 351, 361, 371, or 374 without the recogni-
tion of gain if it were the sole consideration, and
(2) as part of the consideration, another party to the exchange
assumes a liability of the taxpayer, or acquires from the taxpayer
property subject to a liability, then such assumption or acquisition
shall not be treated as money or other property, and shall not
prevent the exchange from being within the provisions of section
11
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VII. ASSUMPTION OF LIABILITIES IN EXCESS OF ADJUSTED BASIS
Although section 357(a) permits the assumption of liabilities
under a tax-free section 351 exchange, the exchange must be for a
bona fide business purpose, or, conversely, must not be for a tax-
avoidance purpose, and the amount of the liabilities assumed by
the transferee corporation must not be in excess of the adjusted
basis of the property transferred. Should the taxpayer fail to com-
ply with section 357, the excess will be treated as a gain from the
sale of an asset resulting in capital gain or ordinary income as the
case may be.7
351, 361, 371, or 374 as the case may be.
(b) Tax Avoidance Purpose.
(1) In General. If, taking into consideration the nature of the
liability and the circumstances in the light of which the
arrangement for the assumption or acquisition was made, it ap-
pears that the principal purpose of the taxpayer with respect to the
assumption or acquisition described in subsection (a)-
(A) was a purpose to avoid Federal income tax on the ex-
change, or
(B) if not such purpose, was not a bona fide business pur-
pose, then such assumption or acquisition (in the total
amount of the liability assumed or acquired pursuant to
such exchange) shall, for purposes of section 351, 361, 371,
or 374 (as the case may be), be considered as money received
by the taxpayer on the exchange.
(2) Burden of Proof. In any suit or proceeding where the burden
is on the taxpayer to prove such assumption or acquisition is not
to be treated as money received by the taxpayer, such burden shall
not be considered as sustained unless the taxpayer sustains such
burden by a clear preponderance of the evidence.
(c) Liabilities in Excess of Basis.
(1) In General. In the case of an exchange-
(A) to which section 351 applies, or
(B) to which section 361 applies by reason of a plan of
reorganization within the meaning of section 368(a)(1)(D),
if the sum of the amount of the liabilities assumed, plus the
amount of the liabilities to which the property is subject,
exceeds the total of the adjusted basis of the property trans-
ferred pursuant to such exchange, then such excess shall be
considered as a gain from the sale or exchange of a capital
asset or of property which is not a capital asset, as the case
may be.
(2) Exceptions.-Paragraph (1) shall not apply to any exchange
to which-
(A) subsection (b)(1) of this section applies, or
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This section has become a trap for the unwary cash basis
taxpayer who transfers zero-basis receivables in a section 351 ex-
change. Although the book value of the assets transferred may well
exceed the liabilities assumed by the transferee corporation, the
liabilities will often exceed the adjusted basis of the assets
transferred, because the adjusted basis of receivables for a cash
basis taxpayer is zero, 75 and receivables often represent a large
proportion of the taxpayer's assets.
Such was the case in Peter Raich.6 Petitioners transferred all
the assets and liabilities of their sole proprietorship to their con-
trolled corporation in exchange for its entire capital stock and a
demand note. The main asset transferred was trade accounts re-
ceivable, having a book value of $77,361.66. The issue of whether
the transfer constituted a taxable exchange under section 357(c)
was raised. Both parties agreed that the transfer qualified as a
section 351 exchange but disagreed with respect to the applicabil-
ity of section 357(c). Particularly, they disagreed as to whether the
liabilities assumed exceeded the adjusted basis of the property
transferred.
The United States Tax Court held the exchange taxable to the
extent the liabilities assumed exceeded the adjusted basis of the
property transferred. The liabilities transferred consisted of trade
accounts payable in the amount of $37,719.78 and notes payable
in the amount of $8,273.03 for a total of $45,992.81. The total assets
transferred had a book value of $88,613.39, but the trade accounts
receivable, which had a book value of $77,361.66, had an adjusted
basis of zero, which made the total adjusted basis of the assets
transferred $11,251.73. 77 This meant the liabilities exceeded the
adjusted basis of the property transferred by $34,741.08. This
amount was held a taxable gain. Petitioners contended that sec-
tion 357(c) should not apply to the transfer because Congress did
not intend the provision to apply when the book value of the assets
transferred exceeded the liabilities' assumed, and the transferor
derived no economic benefit from the assumption. In support of
their economic benefit theory, petitioners relied upon N.F.
Testor.78 In Testor, the transferor was economically benefited by
75Rev. Rul. 69-442, 1969-2 CuN. BULL. 53.
,-46 T.C. 604 (1966).
71The taxpayer also had accounts receivable with a book value of $1,833.97.
Inexplicably, the court did not give these receivables an adjusted basis of zero, but
let them retain their book value.
'740 T.C. 273 (1963), aff'd, 327 F.2d 788 (7th Cir. 1964).
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the corporate assumption of his liabilities because the liabilities
assumed by the corporation exceeded the book value of the assets
as well as their adjusted basis. Petitioners also relied upon an
example cited by both the House and Senate committee reports to
illustrate the applicability of section 357(c). The example involved
a situation where the transferor would have received a present
financial windfall if no tax were imposed at the point of transfer. 7"
However, the tax court held that Congress, in using that particular
example, did not intend to limit the application of 357(c) to facts
identical to those in the example or the Testor case.
In Revenue Ruling 69-442,1o the Internal Revenue Service is-
sued its position with regard to section 357(c) and the Raich case.
The Service said it would apply section 357(c) to fact situations
similar to Raich because the "section literally applies, and the
legislative history clearly supports the application of that section
under such circumstances." 8' However, the service did note that,
had the taxpayer been on the accrual method of accounting rather
than on the cash basis method, the adjusted basis of the trade
accounts receivable would not have been zero.
In Bongiovanni v. Commissioner,2 the taxpayer tried to avoid
the result of the Raich case by adopting the accrual method of
accounting. Taxpayer-appellant operated a masonry contracting
business as a sole proprietorship using the cash receipts and dis-
bursements method of accounting. On April 1, 1965, the taxpayer
transferred all the assets and liabilities of the sole proprietorship
to the Keystone Masonry Corporation in exchange for all the stock
of the corporation plus the corporation's promissory note payable
on demand. On his income tax return for 1965, taxpayer attempted
to adopt the accrual method of accounting although he had oper-
ated his business on the cash basis method prior to the exchange.
The tax court held that appellant's attempt to change accounting
methods was unsuccessful.83 If appellant had adopted the accrual
method at the beginning of the accounting period and secured the
consent of the Commissioner prior to computing his taxable in-
come under the new method, and if the new method had clearly
7S. REp. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 270 (1954); H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d
Cong., 2d Sess. A129 (1954).
"1969-2 CUru. BULL. 53.
11Id. at 54.
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reflected income, the change to the accrual method would have
been approved. However, appellant actually operated on the cash
basis method during the entire accounting period and, at the end
of the period, tried to adopt the accrual method for income tax
purposes only. The Commissioner maintained that appellant real-
ized a taxable gain in the amount of $51,253 because the promisory
note he had received from the corporation constituted other prop-
erty or "boot" within the meaning of section 351(b). With this
appellant agreed, accepting the resulting tax deficiency of
$12,080.44.
However, a further deficiency of $5778.49 was assessed against
appellant as a result of the Commissioner's interpretation of sec-
tion 357(c). The tax court agreed with the Commissioner by hold-
ing that, since appellant was a cash basis taxpayer, his accounts
receivable, work-in-process, raw materials, and tools and supplies
had an adjusted basis of zero. With this adjustment, the liabilities
assumed by the corporation exceeded the assets transferred, result-
ing in a gain of $15,854. The gain was held to constitute ordinary
income taxable under section 357(c). The tax court also held that
appellant's accounts payable were liabilities for purposes of section
357(c).
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
reversed the decision of the tax court. The court stated that it did
not believe the meaning of "liability" as used in section 357(c) was
synonymous with the meaning attached to the term by the ac-
counting profession. "Section 357(c) was meant to apply to what
might be called 'tax' liabilities, i.e., liens in excess of tax costs,
particularly mortgages encumbering property transferred in a sec-
tion 351 transaction.""
In stating its position, the court referred to the following ex-
ample as an illustration of section 357(c):1
Thus, if an individual transfers, under section 351, property
having a basis in his hands of $20,000, but subject to a mortgage
of $50,000, to a corporation controlled by him, such individual
will be subject to tax at rates applicable to the sale of capital
assets with respect to the $30,000, the excess of the liabilities




0'rhe language of the quotation is found in S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d
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The court was of the opinion that, although the legislative history
of section 357(c) was not very illuminating, the purpose of that
section was to prevent a taxpayer from acquiring a permanently
tax-free gain by mortgaging certain property for an amount in
excess of the basis of the property and then transferring the
property and mortgage under section 351. Feeling it was unaccept-
able to apply a combination of sections 351 and 357(c) to trap an
individual merely because he was a cash basis taxpayer rather
than an accrual basis taxpayer, the court found there was no such
tax avoidance purpose in this case. Appellant was denied a deduc-
tion for his uncollected liabilities because he was on the cash basis,
but those same liabilities were recognized as gain under the Com-
missioner's strict interpretation of section 357(c). Thus, the Bon-
giovannis were disadvantaged twice, if not taxed twice.87 The
court's holding was, therefore, based strictly on its interpretation
of the meaning of the word "liability" as used in section 357(c) and
as mentioned in the legislative history of the section. In the court's
interpretation, the payables of a cash basis taxpayer are "liabili-
ties" for accounting purposes but should not be construdd as "lia-
bilities" for tax purposes under section 357(c).
Since this is the only decision to date to interpret section
357(c) in this manner, it will be interesting to see which direction
future cases will take. The tax court sitting in the Second Circuit
will follow the decision of the United States Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit, but the tax courts sitting in other circuits will
not be bound by this decision. The Commissioner will probably
continue to stand on his interpretation that transactions of this
nature should be taxed to the extent that the liabilities assumed
exceed the adjusted basis of the assets transferred. However, the
better view seems to be that of the United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit. In order to test this decision, the Commis-
sioner may bring a similar case in another circuit. If, as a result of
this course of action, a decision favorable to the Commissioner's
viewpoint is rendered, a conflict between the circuits could de-
velop, and the ultimate decision may rest in the United States
Supreme Court. Arguably, such conflict already exists as a result
of the Seventh Circuit's decision in Testor.
Sess. 270 (1954) and H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. A129 (1954). The court
referred to this example in its opinion, without quoting it directly.
.7470 F.2d 921, 924 (2nd Cir. 1972).
-40 T.C. 273 (1963), aff'd, 327 F.2d 788 (7th Cir. 1964). In Testor the court held
that a cash basis taxpayer who transferred all his sole proprietorship's assets and
[Vol. 76
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Although the Bongiovanni decision is conclusive in the Second
Circuit, the Commissioner need not acquiesce, and the taxpayer
must, therefore, proceed with caution. A cash basis sole proprietor-
ship or partnership contemplating a section 351 transaction should
consider, well in advance of the actual transaction, changing to the
accrual method of accounting. However, a change of accounting
methods may pose a special problem to the small business tax-
payer because of his paucity of records, especially inventory re-
cords. A change in accounting methods may also have an adverse
effect on the reflection of income; the income of the sole proprietor-
ship or partnership very likely will be different under the accrual
method of accounting. This could create an undesirable tax prob-
lem of a different nature, especially for a cash basis taxpayer who
had large accounts receivable during a particular accounting pe-
riod but made most of his purchases with cash. A taxpayer in this
situation would, upon switching to the accrual method of account-
ing, realize much larger taxable income than he would have under
the cash basis method. This happens because his receivables,
which would not be included in his gross receipts under the cash
basis method, and which constitute a large proportion of his total
assets, would be included in his gross receipts under the accrual
method, thereby increasing his taxable income. Although he would
be permitted to deduct his liabilities under the accrual method, if
these were small in relation to his receivables, his income would
increase by a large amount merely because he changed accounting
methods. Thus, the taxpayer must weigh all these factors in reach-
ing the decision that will be most beneficial to him. If the taxpayer
decides to change accounting methods, he must secure the consent
of the Commissioner prior to computing his taxable income under
the new method, and the new method must clearly reflect income.
Otherwise, the Commissioner will choose a method which does
clearly reflect income89 In deciding whether to change accounting
methods prior to a section 351 exchange, the taxpayer should keep
liabilities to his controlled corporation was taxable on the excess of liabilities as-
sumed by the corporation over the adjusted basis of the property transferred. How-
ever, in Testor, the liabilities assumed by the corporation exceeded not only the
adjusted basis but also the book value of the property transferred. The facts in
Bongiovanni are decidedly different in this respect since the assumed liabilities
exceeded only the adjusted basis of the property transferred. Viewed in this light,
Testor does not appear to present a true conflict between the circuits as to the
applicability of section 357(c).
"INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 446.
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in mind section 357(b), which states that the exchange must be for
a bona fide business purpose and not for a tax avoidance purpose."
The taxpayer must clearly be able to justify the transaction for
business-related reasons.
Possibly the simplest and most effective method of accom-
plishing a tax-free section 351 exchange would be for the
transferor to transfer all his property except his receivables
and liabilities to the transferee. If this is done, no liabilities are
assumed by the transferee corporation; hence, the liabilities can-
not exceed the adjusted basis of the property transferred. Or, the
transferor could hold back enough of the liabilities to ensure that
the adjusted basis of the property transferred exceeds the liabili-
ties assumed. The receivables retained by the transferor would
generate an inflow of cash which the transferor could use to pay
off the liabilities retained.
A final alternative, which the taxpayer in Raich unsuccess-
fully attempted to use, consists of asserting that the receivables,
even if not valued at market, should still offset the payables. To
support this contention, the taxpayer attempted to prove that his
accounts receivable were encumbered by liens, so that as soon as
they were collected the proceeds would be used to liquidate the
payables. The court did not reject his theory but held that he had
failed to prove the receivables were actually so encumbered.'
Thus, if the taxpayer can prove that his receivables are specifically
encumbered by payables, this avenue may be open to him. Al-
though the door has been unlocked by the Second Circuit, it has
not been opened, and an unwary cash basis taxpayer may yet have
a difficult time getting across the threshold with regard to section
351 and 357 transactions.
In addition to the problems connected with the assumption of
liabilities, the taxpayer must ensure that he complies with the
legal formalities relating to the control requirement. But, if the
transferor wants to avoid a section 351 exchange, he can easily do
so by obtaining less than eighty percent of the stock after the
exchange. In order to qualify for a tax free exchange he must also
avoid receiving stock predominantly in exchange for services which
relate directly to the new corporation. Any debt instrument the
transferor receives in exchange for his property must represent a
continuing interest in the new corporation and not something
'Old. § 357(b).
9-46 T.C. 604 (1966).
[Vol. 76
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closely resembling cash. In order to derive the maximum benefits
from a section 351 exchange, the transferor and transferee must
time the flow of income and expenses so that each can receive the
income attributable to him. Finally, the taxpayer must keep in
mind that the exchange must be for a bona fide business purpose
rather than a tax avoidance purpose. Thus, with careful planning
and preparation in advance, the taxpayer can successfully incorpo-
rate his going concern, whether it is a sole proprietorship or a
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